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Although interpretivists are right to give inner speech a central role in generating self-
knowledge, they mischaracterize the precise nature of this role. Inner speech is 
fundamentally an action, a form of speech, and provides us with self-knowledge not 
by being something that we perceive (or “quasi-perceive”) and interpret, but by being 





A recently proposed account of self-knowledge that I will call “interpretivism” 
(Carruthers 2009, 2011; Cassam 2011, 2014) takes inner speech to play an important 
role in generating the kind and degree of self-knowledge that adult human beings 
typically have. However, proponents of this view have misunderstood the role that it 
plays in self-knowledge, and it is one that actually undermines interpretivism. 
In line with the existing debate on the topic, by “self-knowledge” I mean 
coming to have knowledge about our own propositional attitude standing states 
(namely, our own beliefs, desires, intentions etc.) and events (namely, our thoughts, 
judgments, decisions etc.). I am not concerned with knowledge about oneself in a 
more everyday sense, of one’s appearance or geographical location, of one’s life 
history, or even of one’s personality, although these certainly have a claim to being 
called “self-knowledge”, and inner speech may also have a role to play in some or all 
of these.1 I will also, for reasons that should become clear, not be concerned with 
knowledge of our sensory states, or even of our emotions.  
I proceed as follows. I begin by introducing interpretivism and explain why 
inner speech is so important for the interpretivist, and show how the interpretivist 
																																																								
1 See, for example, Morin 2005 on the relationship between inner speech and self-awareness.  
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construes it. I then look more closely at the nature of inner speech, including how and 
why it has developed in humans, and suggest some consequences that this has for the 
epistemology of inner speech. Taking this on board, I present the role that inner 
speech truly plays in self-knowledge, in terms of our knowledge of actions in general, 




1. Interpretivism and Inner Speech 
 What I am calling “interpretivism” is the view that we only ever have unaided 
self-knowledge (as opposed to, say, self-knowledge from the testimony of a friend or 
therapist) through a process of self-interpretation.  
 
1.1. From anti-introspectionism to interpretivism 
Interpretivism is a positive thesis, built upon the negative thesis of anti-
introspectionism, and, in particular, anti-introspectionism for propositional attitudes. 
How I know that I am visually experiencing red or feeling pain may well be a matter 
of introspection; what is in doubt is whether my beliefs, desires, intentions are things 
that I come to know by introspection. Anti-introspectionism is the claim that we never 
have introspective access to our propositional attitudes. What is meant by 
introspection is the following. 
 
Introspection: Some quasi-perceptual inner sense, which purportedly provides us with 
direct knowledge of our own mental phenomena. 
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 Although there are importantly different ways of thinking about introspection, 
what they all share is that a subject can find out about the introspectable mental 
phenomenon without needing to find out anything else first. To visually perceive a 
cup, all I need is appropriate perceptual capacities (including perhaps relevant 
“conceptual capacities”), and the presence of a cup (in good lighting conditions etc.). 
Similarly, if I have the right introspective capacities, the introspectable phenomenon 
can make itself known in a similar fashion. I do not, for example, need to make an 
inference from some other information in order to gain knowledge of that 
phenomenon. The anti-introspectionist (about a particular class of mental phenomena) 
denies this (for that class of mental phenomena). As I’ve said, the kind of anti-
introspectionism that interests us here, since interpretivism is built on it, is anti-
introspectionism for propositional attitudes.  
 Anti-introspectionism tells us how we don’t get knowledge of our 
propositional attitudes. But how do we typically get such knowledge? The 
interpretivist’s answer is: through an interpretative process. This we can gloss by 
quoting a prominent interpretivist:  
 
[A]n interpretative process . . . is one that accesses information about the 
subject’s current circumstances, or the subject’s current or recent behavior, as 
well as any other information about the subject’s current or recent mental life. 
For this is the sort of information that we must rely on when attributing mental 
states to other people. (Carruthers 2009, p. 123, emphasis added) 
 
 
1.2. Rylean symmetry  
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An oft-noted consequence of the interpretivist position, which is briefly 
mentioned in the final sentence of the passage just quoted, is the symmetry of self-
knowledge and knowledge of others. Here Ryle is sometimes (e.g. Byrne 2008, 
Cassam 2014) quoted as a classic proponent:  
 
The sorts of things I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of 
things I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out 
are much the same. (Ryle 1949, pp.155-6) 
 
Although this quotation is taken out of context, and an excessive focus on it yields an 
inaccurate portrayal of Ryle’s overall position, it is clear what the message is 
supposed to be. Everyone agrees that I cannot introspect the mental states of others. 
However, the interpretivist insists, I cannot do this for my own mental states either, at 
least not my own propositional attitudes. To use terminology that Ryle wouldn’t have 
used, for this I need to turn the same interpretative mindreading capacities I use to 
gain knowledge of other people’s mental states upon myself.  
 This “Rylean symmetry” yields a couple of predictions that the interpretivist 
makes (see, e.g., Carruthers 2009 where these predictions are explicitly made), and 
which diverge from the predictions the introspectionist would make. Given that the 
interpretivist requires for self-knowledge, as with knowledge of others, that the 
prospective knower have (i) the appropriate interpretative capacity, and (ii) the right 
inputs for that capacity to operate upon, we get the following two predictions. The 
first is that there should be no dissociation between the capacity to attribute 
propositional attitudes to others and to oneself: somebody who is impaired in 
attributing propositional attitudes to others ought to exhibit impairment in self-
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attribution. The second is that, even if that capacity is intact, if the relevant input is 
lacking (or misleading) there should be a corresponding lack of (or mistake in) self-
knowledge. The first prediction seems to be born out by studies conducted on 
individuals with autism (Williams and Happe 2010, Williams et al. 2016). The second 
prediction appears to be born out by data from confabulation in a number of contexts 
(e.g. Gazzaniga 2000).  
 
1.3. Why is inner speech so important to the interpretivist? 
We can see the importance of inner speech to the interpretivist by reflecting on 
the following criticism pre-empted by Carruthers:  
 
I seem to be able to know what I am currently thinking and planning even 
though I am sitting quiet and motionless… How is this possible, the critics [of 
interpretivism] ask, unless we have access to our own mental states that isn’t 
interpretive, but rather introspective? (Carruthers 2009: p.123) 
 
A central part of his response to this relies on inner speech. One type of information 
that clearly grounds an attribution of a mental state to someone else concerns not only 
a subject’s behaviour, but also their utterances. If you see your friend John go to the 
fridge, you might think that he wants something that he believes is in the fridge. 
Utterances have the added feature of being more informationally fine-grained. If John 
says, prior to going to the fridge, “I’m getting a Coke”, I can thereby refine my 
interpretation from “He’s getting something that he believes is in the fridge” to “He’s 
getting a Coke”. 
As with John, I can interpret not only my own behaviour, but also my own 
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utterances. Herein lies the importance of inner speech to the interpretivist. There are 
times when certain sources of evidence for self-interpretation (e.g. perceiving one’s 
own behaviour, proprioceptive data etc.) are unavailable (“I am sitting quiet and 
motionless”), and yet we would say that we do have access to what we judge, decide, 
believe, desire, and so forth. As a result, there must be something else, but still 
sensory or quasi-sensory, which serves as the basis for our self-interpretations. 
Carruthers, for example, claims that data about “visual and auditory imagery 
(including sentences rehearsed in inner speech), patterns of attention, emotional 
feelings…” (2009, p.4, emphasis added)  can also serve as the basis for our self-
interpretation, and hence self-knowledge.  
 
1.4. Inner speech as in need of interpretation 
 As we’ve just seen, interpretivists appeal to inner speech as one important 
form of imagery, among others, that serves as grounds for self-interpretation. More 
specifically, interpretivists like Carruthers and Cassam think that there is no 
categorical difference between interpreting your own utterances (whether in inner or 
outer speech) and someone else’s utterances.  
As Carruthers explicitly states, “[a]ll speech – whether the speech of oneself 
or someone else – needs to be interpreted before it can be understood” (Carruthers 
2009, p.5). What this, in turn, suggests is that one needs to interpret one’s utterances 
to ascertain both their content (e.g. disambiguate the meaning of ambiguous words), 
and their illocutionary force (e.g. work out if something is a question, or an assertion, 
or a command etc.). Here is Carruthers pre-empting an objection derived from this: 
 
But how is it, then, that our own utterances are not ambiguous to us, in the 
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way that the utterances of other people often are? If I find myself thinking, “I 
shall walk to the bank,” then I don’t need to wonder which sort of bank is in 
question (a river bank, or a place where one gets money). And this fact might 
be taken to indicate that I must have introspective access to my intentions. 
However, there will generally be cues available to disambiguate our own 
utterances, which wouldn’t be available to help interpret the similar utterances 
of another. For example, just prior to the utterance I might have formed a 
visual image of my local bank, or I might have activated a memory image of 
an empty wallet. (Carruthers 2009, p.5) 
 
I hope to show that, contrary to this view, we (typically) don’t need to 
interpret our own utterances (in inner or outer speech), at least not in the same way 
that we need to interpret the utterances of others. 
 To sum up, then, not only does inner speech play an important role in 
generating self-knowledge for the interpretivist, but it is also presented as merely one 
out of a number of forms of imagery that stands in need of interpretation. Granted, 
interpretivists do acknowledge that, at least some forms of inner speech have motoric 
aspects. Nevertheless, they see that as simply another way of generating the relevant 
imagery, the relevant “grist for the interpretative mill”. I think instead that this 
provides a clue to the special role that inner speech plays in the generation of self-
knowledge.  
 To show why I think this, I’m going to address two separate but importantly 
related issues. On the one hand, there is the issue of what inner speech is in homo 
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sapiens, and how and why it occurs.2 I will call this “the psychology of inner speech” 
(where “psychology” is broadly construed to include, e.g., both cognitive 
neuroscience and developmental psychology). Much of this interpretivists can agree 
with. They simply don’t take the relevant lessons from it, and that is what I move on 
to. That is the issue of what inner speech does for us epistemically. I will call this “the 
epistemology of inner speech”. I address these in turn.  
 
 
2. The psychology of inner speech 
The psychology of inner speech will be addressed from two perspectives. The 
first is in terms of how and why inner speech typically develops in humans. The 
second is in terms of what inner speech is, as a phenomenon, once it has fully 
developed. 
 
2.1. The developmental trajectory of inner speech 
How does inner speech develop, and what purpose does it serve? One very 
attractive theory is that inner speech starts off as overt (viz. outer) speech (Vygotsky 
1987/1934). That is to say, whatever function inner speech plays, once it has 
developed, is played by overt speech in children who have not yet developed the 
capacity to engage in inner speech. This capacity to engage in inner speech is usually 
seen as the capacity to inhibit the overt production of speech (see Alderson-Day and 
Fernyhough 2014). 
According to this story, inner speech is the end product of a developmental 
trajectory that begins with private speech. “Private speech” refers to speech that is not 
																																																								
2 The reference to our species is to illustrate that possible cognizers could, in principle, engage in 
something like inner speech, but implement it in a different way. 	
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produced for the benefit of anyone other than the speaker. Thus, although there is an 
important sense in which inner speech is always de facto private speech, pragmatics 
dictates that “private speech” tends to refer to overt private speech, rather than inner 
speech (since inner speech is obviously private). Young children will first, under the 
guidance of a caregiver, learn to reason verbally, but out loud, for the benefit of 
guiding their thinking and attention, and for learning to “navigate” in light of basic 
social norms. Over time, they learn to inhibit its overt production (which is 
sometimes, somewhat misleadingly, called “internalization”). Furthermore, the reason 
why an auditory phenomenology is often reported is because, as with any aborted 
overt action (motor imagery), the predictions of the sensory consequences of the 
would-be action come into play, activating sensory (and somatosensory) cortices (this 
is central to feedback, which is crucial for all successful motoric activity).3  
 
2.2. Inner speech as a genuinely productive phenomenon 
What is going on when someone is engaged in inner speech? It is tempting to 
think of inner speech in terms of auditory imagination. Engaging in inner speech, on 
such a view, consists in imagining the sound of you speaking (or imagining hearing 
yourself speak). This is not what inner speech is widely thought to be among the 
scientists who investigate it (see Alderson-Day and Fernyhough 2015, for a 
comprehensive review). Inner speech is a genuinely productive phenomenon rather 
than a recreative phenomenon. This status of being “genuinely productive” is 
reflected in two related claims, which I will elaborate on sequentially. The first is that 
inner speech is motoric. The second is that inner speech is typically (and primarily) 
used for making speech acts. An upshot of this is that it is unhelpful to think of inner 
																																																								
3	See Jeannerod 1995 for a classic presentation of this, and Adams et al. 2013 for the same within a 
predictive processing framework.	
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speech in terms of imagination.  
Evidence of motoric involvement in inner speech has been empirically 
supported by several electromyographical (EMG) studies, measuring muscular 
activity during inner speech (Rapin et al. 2013) some of which date as far back as the 
early 1930’s (e.g. Jacobsen 1931). In short, these discovered that when you engage in 
inner speech muscles in the face and throat, associated with speaking, are activated. 
This fits nicely with the Vygotskian story presented in the previous section since it 
suggests that motoric vestiges of the overt speech remain.  
More recently, there have been brain-imaging studies presenting results that 
are very much in keeping with a distinction between imagined speech and a more 
motoric phenomenon, namely, inner speech. In particular, Tian and Poeppel (2012) 
and Tian, Zarati and Poeppel (2016) have shown that there are two very different 
ways of generating auditory-verbal imagery, namely, of activating relevant areas of 
auditory sensory cortices in the absence of external sensory stimulation. One, which 
corresponds to inner speech (which they call “articulation imagery”) is induced 
through “motor simulation”, i.e. is initiated “top-down” by activation in areas of 
prefrontal and motor cortex associated with speaking. The other, which corresponds 
to inner hearing/imagined speech, is induced, in line with more standard accounts of 
imagery (including in other modalities, such as vision) via a memory-attention-based 
mechanism (e.g. Kosslyn 1994), namely, the bottom-up re-creation of a sensory 
encounter. 
As for the second point, we can distinguish (as Roessler 2016 does) between a 
“mere act of inner speech” and an “inner speech act”, in a way that perfectly mirrors 
the distinction between a “mere act of speech” and a “speech act”. There are several 
different ways of thinking about speech acts, and it is important to be clear about what 
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I mean here. To simplify somewhat, one can think of speech acts in broadly two 
ways: as fundamentally conventional or as fundamentally expressive. In the first 
sense, a “speech act” involves the bringing about of a certain state of affairs (often, 
but not always an institutional state of affairs) through speech, and is heavily tied to 
convention. This is most clearly seen in explicitly performative utterances like “I 
nominate…”, “I hearby sentence you…” etc, but can be extended to more mundane 
utterances like assertion. This is the original way of thinking of speech acts and is 
associated with Austin 1962 (and Searle 1969). An importantly different sense, which 
can be seen as growing out of Strawson’s (1964) critique of Austin, takes speech acts 
not to be determined by convention, but by virtue of the mental states that they 
express. A similar conception of speech acts is also found in Bach and Harnish 
(1979). This second sense of speech acts, as being the expression of particular mental 
states, is the sense that is relevant to us here. 
The central point for our purposes is that speech acts are closely tied to the 
speaker’s mental state in a way that mere acts of speech are not. Examples will make 
things clearer. Reciting a poem, or quoting someone, or repeating an address so as to 
remember it, is an act of speech but it is not a speech act. This is, in part, because the 
speaker, in reciting, or quoting, or repeating, does not mean what is being said, and 
any potential variations in the subject’s mental states are compatible with the same act 
being performed (and variations in what is quoted, repeated, recited do not thereby 
signal similar variations in the subject’s mental states). In stark contrast, asserting, 
requesting, demanding, questioning are speech acts. These require, if they are sincere, 
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that the person performing them be in certain states of mind, and they thereby express 
those states of mind.4  
This illustrates why inner speech is not helpfully thought of as imagined 
speech (or even less as rehearsed speech) but rather as speech. Consider the 
following: 
1. Jane asserted that p 
2. Jane imagined asserting that p 
3. Jane asserted in inner speech that p 
Whereas 3 suggests 1, 2 does not. In fact, 2 suggests not-1: merely imagining 
asserting typically rules out actually asserting (just like merely imagining raising your 
right hand rules out you actually doing so). On the other hand, an assertion in inner 
speech is a perfectly good instance of assertion. And insofar as 1 and 3 are both 
assertions, they both, if sincere, require that Jane be in a certain mental state 
(commonly thought to be believing that p). In a related manner, assertions that p are 
typically treated as evidence for the attribution of the mental states that they (if 
sincere) require (or express), in this case, believing that p. Thus if someone asserts, 
“Paris is the capital of France”, you will (other things being equal) think that they 
believe that Paris is the capital of France. The same applies to other kinds of speech 
act, and other kinds of speech act are intimately tied to other kinds of mental state. 
Orders and requests are tied to goals, questions are tied to desires to know, 
compliments are tied to positive evaluations, insults to negative evaluations, etc. And 
when people request, question, compliment or insult, if we take them to be sincere, 
we thereby take them to be in those states of mind. 
																																																								
4 Of course, an insincere assertion purports to express a state of mind that it doesn’t in fact express, 
hence why it is misleading. 
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 In short, inner speech, in its natural form (the form it takes when it is fulfilling 
the function for which it evolved and developed), is most certainly not a rehearsal: it’s 
the real deal. An assertion in inner speech is an assertion, not a rehearsed assertion; an 
insult in inner speech is an insult (even though the target cannot hear it), not a 
rehearsed insult.  
So far, there is nothing here that the interpretivist need disagree with, but it 
forms a crucial basis for my position in a way that it doesn’t so much for theirs. 
 
2.3. Three important clarifications 
 At this point I’d like to clarify three things. The first is that, while inner speech 
is not helpfully understood in terms of imagination, it may still involve imagery (in 
particular, a combination of sensory and motoric imagery). To see this, we need to get 
clear on the distinction between “imagination” and “imagery”. Imagination is a 
personal-level phenomenon. Whereas people imagine, they don’t “do imagery”. 
Imagery is a qualitative component of any number of personal-level phenomena: 
when people imagine, remember, reminisce, reason, judge, hypothesize etc. these can 
(and probably will) all involve imagery to some degree (a point nicely made by 
Langland-Hassan 2015). In a similar way, imagery (both motoric and auditory) may 
be involved in an inner assertion. That does not, however, make the inner assertion 
nothing more than the imagery involved in its production, still less an act of 
imagination. An assertion in inner speech is not re-creating a state of affairs (for 
whatever purpose) it is bringing about a state of affairs: it is a genuine assertion.  
 The second thing to clarify is that inner speech acts, although they may, they 
need not involve auditory imagery at all. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the 
congenitally deaf population. Inner “speech” in the congenitally deaf population 
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involves visuo-motoric imagery of sign language (of signing oneself more than of 
reading sign – it is productive not receptive (see Atkinson 2006)). Furthermore, the 
extent to which inner speech in the hearing population is reported as auditory varies 
enormously (McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough 2011). 
The third clarificatory point worth raising is the possibility of non-linguistic 
expressive acts, and hence, as speech act theorists have long acknowledged, of non-
linguistic “speech” acts (e.g. a rude gesture or a communicative glance). Thus there 
may be inner equivalents of these, namely, inner expressive acts that don’t make use 
of speech per se. The point is, rather, that inner speech is special in its capacity as a 
potential vehicle, and quintessential vehicle, of inner speech acts, of internal acts of 
expression. There may be other such vehicles, but these will lack the precision of the 
linguistic act, and will require the same aspects that enable inner speech acts to be 




3. The epistemology of inner speech 
Inner speech is an action, and, more specifically, speech. And, like overt 
speech, its primary use is in performing speech acts. So it is natural to ask: What 
knowledge do we have of our own speech acts (whether in inner or outer speech)? 
Since speech acts are a form of action, I will start by addressing our knowledge of our 
actions generally, and then refine this account to address our knowledge of our own 
speech acts.  
 
3.1. Knowing what we are doing 
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 According to the interpretivist, we know what we are doing in the same way 
that we know what someone else is doing: we interpret sensory or quasi-sensory 
information. This process of interpretation, it must be granted, is a rich and 
multifaceted phenomenon that takes into account a plethora of information, including 
dynamic and temporally extended contextual information. Taking this richness into 
account goes a long way towards allaying concerns, but I would like to show how this 
view is still not right.  
 A canonical indication that someone knows what they are doing is that they 
can accurately answer the question “What are you doing?” An interesting feature of 
the “doings” typically referred to in these questions is that they are not determined by 
what you are physically doing in a publicly observable sense. As Falvey (2000) puts 
it: 
Suppose a friend stops by my house and wants to go for a walk, and I say, “I 
can’t; I’m making bread.” This could be true even if as I say it I’m sitting on 
the couch reading the newspaper - perhaps I’m waiting for the bread to rise 
before putting it in the oven. (p.22) 
Somebody observing me at that point would have no reason to think that I was 
making bread. That is because my making bread is a temporally extended, serial 
operation, guided by the overarching intention to make bread. This in itself is not 
problematic for interpretivists, since they could simply say that there is a difference, 
not in the type of process whereby the belief in what I am doing is reached, but rather 
in the amount of information I have as the agent. After all, somebody who had more 
information, who had for example observed me make the dough, put it in the 
cupboard, and sit on the couch, might also be able to answer the question “What is he 
doing?” correctly, namely, by saying “He’s making bread.” This is true. However, 
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there are two differences between my knowledge of what I am doing, and that of even 
a long-term and well-informed observer. The first is to do with what we might call 
engagement. The second is to do with authority. 
It would be odd to say that I did not know what I was doing until I was asked. 
My answer demonstrates knowledge that I already have. This knowledge that I have 
in acting knowingly is not something that is available to the observer: it is only 
available to the agent. This is because the agent is engaged in what they are doing, 
whereas the observer clearly can’t be so engaged. This is nicely illustrated by the fact 
that we can turn the spotlight on the observer. Someone could enter the room and 
catch the observer with their face to the telescope and ask “What are you doing?” The 
observer might say, “I’m watching SW make bread”. The observer was (in the good 
case) watching me knowingly. They knew that they were watching me before being 
asked, since that is what they were knowingly engaged in. I, the agent, when asked 
what I am doing, say “I’m making bread”, not (as it would if my epistemic situation 
were equivalent to that of an observer) “I’m watching myself make bread”.  
The second difference, which is related, comes from the agent’s authority, in 
knowing what they are doing, in either correcting their behavior to be in line with 
what they intend to be doing, or to change their mind about what they are doing. To 
paraphrase another nice example from Falvey (2000, p.28), suppose my neighbour is 
observing me through a telescope. She sees me put the kettle on and take down the 
teapot. She then sees me take down a tin marked “Darjeeling”, and begin to spoon 
some of its contents into the pot. At that point she would understandably conclude 
that I am making Darjeeling. But suppose that my intention was actually to make Irish 
Breakfast tea, and I was just being absent-minded. I don’t thereby update my belief 
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and conclude that I’m actually making Darjeeling. The knowledge of my intention to 
make Irish Breakfast trumps the fact that it looks like I’m making Darjeeling.  
Again, this might not in itself trouble the interpretivist: the knowledge of that 
intention may come from my recollection that, at some point prior to making tea I 
said to myself (perhaps, but not necessarily, in inner speech), “Hmm… I feel like tea. 
I had Darjeeling this morning and I fancy a change. I’ll have some Irish Breakfast.” 
Suppose this were said out loud, an observer might also say “Oh no! He’s making 
Darjeeling by mistake!” So far, so good. However, suppose I notice my mistake but 
instead say to myself, “I can’t be bothered to put this tea back in the tin, and I don’t 
feel that strongly about what kind of tea I have,” and with a shrug I change my plans 
and make Darjeeling. Again, the interpretivist might say that an observer with access 
to all of that too might say “Oh he’s changed his mind and is making Darjeeling 
now”. But the observer is not in the same position as me, because it is up to me to 
change my mind. And I do not need to observe that I have changed my mind in order 
to know that I have done so. As Moran (2001) (and several others) are keen to 
emphasize, the observer is always one step behind the agent in this respect. These 
decisions are the agent’s to make. 
 
3.2. Knowing what we are saying 
The interpretivist will claim that we know what we are saying in a way that is 
in principle no different to how we know what others are saying. As with knowing 
what we are doing, I don’t think that this symmetry holds. Again, I appeal to 
differences in engagement and authority.  
Contrary to what both interpretivists seem to suggest, if I’m in the middle of a 
debate and I make an assertive statement “p”, I don’t need to listen to myself to know 
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that my statement was an assertion as opposed to a question, or that it was an 
assertion that p as opposed to an assertion that q. That is because I am engaged in an 
activity, and my assertion that p is born out of my desire and intention to make the 
point that p. For example, my interlocutor might say something that I disagree with, 
and I engage with that directly. It would be totally mischaracterizing the situation to 
say that I said something, heard myself say it, and interpreted myself.  
Similarly, if I say the wrong thing, in the sense of not saying what I mean, if I 
notice it at all, I have the authority to correct it. And if I don’t notice it, my 
assumption is that I said what I meant to say (indeed that is what not noticing it 
amounts to). If I taste a soup that I’m cooking with a friend and I say “It needs more 
salt” when what I mean to say is that it needs more pepper (which I mean to say 
because that’s what I think the soup needs), I’ll either, if I notice my mistake, correct 
myself, or simply assume that I said “It needs more pepper” (since that is, after all, 
what the soup needs!). I would suggest that the latter is not particularly rare, and it 
strongly suggests that it is not what I actually say, in the observable sense, that 
predominantly determines what I think I said. Again, I am not saying that this is 
because we have direct introspective access to our communicative intentions (and 
propositional attitudes more generally), but rather that our speech acts are 
contextually embedded in the flow of our – predominantly world-directed, rather than 
self-directed – lives as agents. The overarching mistake in the interpretivist picture is 
that it mischaracterizes self-knowledge as an explicitly self-directed interpretative 
enterprise. This is thankfully not something we often do, since it is highly disruptive. 
And yet we are not self-ignorant as a result of not doing this. 
 The fact that the contexts in which we take the observational stance towards 
ourselves tend to be corrective is highly illustrative. It shows that I don’t typically use 
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these observations to generate self-knowledge. Rather, I am using them for a sort of 
supervisory monitoring, a verification that what I am doing or saying is in line with 
what I already know (firmly, if implicitly) I mean to do or say (Anscombe (1957, p. 
53) makes an identical point). And unlike for the observer, this third-personal 
observational data isn’t additional evidence that enters into competition with earlier 
evidence. Where an observer might well say to herself, “Oh perhaps he has changed 
his mind and wants to make Darjeeling after all”, I will not be tempted to consider 
whether my own actions (or indeed words) betray that I have, unbeknownst to me, 
changed my mind. 
So, explicit acts of self-observation are sometimes used, but usually to monitor 
and correct, to keep observable behavior in line with what we already know we are 
trying to do or say. But what makes this knowledge then, if not the amount and quality 
of evidence that grounds it? In more mainstream branches of epistemology (i.e. those 
concerned with the nature of knowledge more generally) it is not especially 
controversial to claim that knowledge can be attained in the absence of evidential 
grounds. For example, one can appeal to reliability (e.g. Goldman 1979), or to 
epistemic virtue (e.g. Sosa 2007). These options could easily be exploited here (and 
have been by Bar-On and Nolfi 2016). We are generally very good at knowing what 
we are doing, and what we are saying. To say that we are good at this because we 
have good evidence grounding such knowledge seems to be a gross 
mischaracterization of our daily lives. It is rather because we are generally good at 
this (and we aren’t always) that we count as self-knowing agents (when we get things 
right). 
 
4. The Role of Inner Speech in Self-Knowledge  
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 Now we are in a position to address the role that inner speech plays in self-
knowledge. Remember that what we are concerned with is knowledge of 
propositional attitude states and events. For ease, I will focus on belief as an exemplar 
state, and judgement (of both the theoretical and practical kind) as an exemplar event, 
but what I say applies to all propositional attitude states and events mutatis mutandis. 
 In good cases, we know what we are doing and saying in virtue of doing and 
saying those things knowingly, and not in virtue of some kind of sensory or quasi-
sensory evidence. But this debate is not primarily about how we know our own 
actions or speech acts: it is about how we know our propositional attitudes. So what is 
the relationship between knowing what we are doing and saying, and knowing the 
relevant propositional attitudes?  
 The relationship between action and intention is relatively straightforward. In 
virtue of knowing that I am φing (or indeed, trying and failing to φ) I thereby know 
that I am intending to φ. Things are more complicated for speech acts. For notice that, 
although φ could take a speech act as its value (speech acts are actions, after all), this 
extrapolation from action to speech act is not what we are after. We are not after an 
account of how, for example, knowledge that I am asserting that p generates 
knowledge that I intend to assert that p. Rather we are after an account of how 
knowledge that I am asserting that p can generate knowledge that I believe that p. In 
short, we are not after knowledge of the speech act, but knowledge of the mental state 
that the speech act (in the good case) expresses. And it isn’t simply that knowledge of 
assertion translates into knowledge of belief, since assertions can fail to express 
beliefs, whether deliberately or accidentally. What account can we give of the 
relationship between knowledge of assertion and knowledge of belief?  
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Here is my favoured account. All action is revealing. It reveals the agent’s 
state of mind. My walking across a bridge reveals my belief that the bridge is safe to 
walk across. But some action is designed to be revealing. It is expressive. Thus a 
smile is plausibly designed to show joy, an exclamation of “Ouch!” is plausibly 
designed to show pain etc. These behaviours express joy and pain respectively. How 
we cash out this notion of “design” is somewhat up for grabs: we can talk about 
biological design, sociocultural design, and even the intentional design of an 
individual.5 It probably pays to be pluralistic about this, since then we can map 
different kinds of design onto different kinds of expressive behaviour. 
 Speech acts are a particularly sophisticated form of expressive behaviour: an 
assertion is designed to reveal (and therefore expresses) my belief, a question is 
designed to reveal my interrogative state, a promise, my committed intention to do 
something etc. How does this design work? One place to start is with the observation 
that speech acts require certain intentions on the part of the speaker. However, it 
should be noted that, the intention necessarily involved in, say, an assertion, is not the 
intention to express a belief for the following two reasons. First, an agent (e.g. a 
young child) can assert without having the concept of belief (Breheny 2006 makes a 
similar point). Second, assuming (as we are, for the sake of argument) anti-
introspectionism and the role that inner speech is supposed to play in generating self-
knowledge, how can I intend to express a belief if I don’t know that I have that belief, 
since that is what the speech act is supposed to generate for me in the first place? No: 
the intention must be world-directed rather than self-directed. In the case of assertion, 
this is the intention to inform (or glean information, in the case of a question, or 
commit oneself to doing something in the case of a promise etc.) and it is a matter of 
																																																								
5 For example, I might walk across the bridge, not because I simply want to get to the other side (and 
believe that it is safe), but because I want to show you that it is safe (and I thereby show you that I 
believe it to be safe). This is walking across the bridge in an expressive way.	
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sociocultural norms that assertions express beliefs (questions express desires to know 
etc). In other words, the design we need emerges out of sociocultural norms, and our 
practices exploit those norms. But crucially, I don’t need to know those norms 
explicitly in order to exploit them and be subject to them. When I intend to inform (or 
misinform), I assert. And my assertion (if sincere) will express a belief. But that does 
not mean that my intention was to express a given belief. Although it is in principle 
possible for an asserter to have such an intention, it is an excessively sophisticated 
intention as a minimal condition of assertion. 
A consequence of this is that I don’t need to know my belief before making 
the assertion that expresses it. It seems therefore plausible that often an initial 
assertion (whether in inner or outer speech) isn’t the result of your knowledge of your 
belief, but rather generates it. Thus I agree with Carruthers (2009, p. 125) that 
sometimes your first knowledge of your belief is “via its verbal expression”. 
However, what I mean by this (both by “via” and by “expression”) is rather different. 
Carruthers reveals this difference in the very next sentence by claiming that “such 
speech, like all speech, will need to be interpreted to extract its significance” (2009, p. 
125). In contrast, it seems to me deeply implausible that I interpret my own speech 
acts. Self-knowledge of my belief is generated by my sincere and expressively apt 
assertion, not because I hear that assertion and attribute a belief to myself, but rather 
because, if that assertion is indeed sincere and expressively apt, it in itself exemplifies 
my knowledge of what I believe (as Bar-On 2004 rightly points out). That is what I 
would mean by “via its verbal expression”. 
There is, however, an important supervisory role for interpretation; for 
example, ascertaining whether what we have just asserted is what we intended to 
assert, or is in line with a belief we actually have (viz. is sincere). I can only tell if 
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I’ve expressed myself badly, or have been insincere, by taking an “interpretative 
stance” towards myself.6 However, it is worth acknowledging how rare this actually 
is, and (more importantly) how unnecessary it is in order for an agent to count as self-
knowing on a given occasion. In what sense is someone who has asserted something 
with utmost sincerity, precision and expressive aptitude, but failed to interpret 
themselves, guilty of self-ignorance? I would suggest, along with Ryle himself, that if 
we are tempted to call this person in any way self-ignorant or epistemically defective, 
then we are thinking about all of this in the wrong way. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 If we see the phenomenon of inner speech for what it really is, namely, as an 
action that is primarily used in the performance of speech acts, then we get a rather 
different account of the role that it plays in self-knowledge. Inner speech is not simply 
imagery that needs to be interpreted like the speech of another agent. It is an action, 
and, as with other actions, is something that we tend to engage in knowingly. We 
don’t need to interpret ourselves to know what we are saying (in inner or overt 
speech) anymore than we need to interpret ourselves in order to know what we are 
doing. Furthermore, what we say is often an apt and knowledgeable expression of our 
propositional attitude states. In short, although it seems to me plausible that we do not 
ever know our beliefs and intentions, or our judgements and decisions, by 
introspection, we do not only know them by interpretation. In short, introspection and 
interpretation are not the only two options. 
																																																								
6 Indeed the data from autism and confabulation seems to support interpretivism because the 
experiments in question generate unecological scenarios where this unusual interpretative stance needs 
to be adopted.	
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 Viewed in the most general light, my concern with interpretivism, which I 
explored here through the lens of thinking about inner speech, is not about the 
importance of interpretation for self-knowledge, still less is it about anti-
introspectionism. I am happy to accept both of these things. It is rather about the 
strong “Rylean symmetry” (which Ryle himself didn’t fully subscribe to anyway) that 
is taken to be a consequence of interpretivism. You don’t need to posit mysterious 
powers of introspection, or to play down the importance of interpretation, to claim 
that an agent, in virtue of being an agent, knows herself in a different way to the way 
an observer does, or ever can. This kind of knowledge is nicely reflected in the 
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